Besides the better-known Nelson logic (N 3) and paraconsistent Nelson logic (N 4), in 1959 David Nelson introduced, with motivations of arithmetic and constructibility, a logic that he called S. The logic S was originally introduced by means of a calculus (crucially lacking the contraction rule) with infinitely many rule schemata and no semantics (other than the intended interpretation into arithmetic). We look here at the propositional fragment of S, showing that it is algebraizable (in fact, implicative) in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi with respect to a variety of three-potent involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first known algebraic semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson's presentation; this also allows us to settle the relation between S and the other two Nelson logics mentioned above.
Introduction
In the course of his investigations into the notion of constructible falsity, David Nelson introduced a number of systems of non-classical logics that have aroused considerable interest in the logic and algebraic logic community (see, e.g., [24] and the references cited therein). Over the years, the main goal of Nelson's enterprise was to provide logical formalisms that allow for more fine-grained analyses of notions such as falsity and negation than either classical or intuitionistic logic can afford.
Nelson's analysis of the meaning of falsity is in many ways analogous, or as one may say 'dual', to the intuitionistic analysis of truth. Thus, as the intuitionists argued against the principle of excluded middle ϕ ∨ ∼ϕ, Nelson was led to introduce logical formalisms that also reject some form of the principle of explosion (ex contradictione quodlibet ). The resulting logics combine an intuitionistic approach to truth and a dual-intuitionistic treatment of falsity, not unlike the one found in the so-called biintuitionistic logic [26] .
In fact, the systems in the family nowadays known as Nelson's logics share many properties with the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic (in particular, they do not validate Peirce's law (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ ϕ) ⇒ ϕ, while possessing a negation connective which shows some inconsistency-tolerant features, in the sense that formulas such as (ϕ ∧ ∼ϕ) ⇒ ψ need not be valid either. The oldest and most well-known of these systems was introduced in [22] and is today known simply as Nelson logic (following [24] , we shall denote it by N 3). This logic is by now well understood, both from a proof-theoretic (see, e.g., [20] ) and from an algebraic point of view [31] , with both perspectives allowing us to regard N 3 as a substructural logic [16] .
Paraconsistent Nelson logic N 4 is a weakening of N 3 that was introduced in [4] (and also, independently, in [19] and [29] ) as, precisely, a paraconsistent version of N 3. Our understanding of the proof-theoretic as well as the algebraic properties of N 4 is more recent and still not thorough. However, thanks to recent results of M. Spinks and R. Veroff, it is now known that N 4 can be viewed as a member of the family of so-called relevance logics in that it can be presented, to within definitional equivalence, as an axiomatic extension of the contraction-free relevant logic RW (for a summary of this work, see [33] ).
Thanks mainly to the works of S. Odintsov [24] , we also know that N 4 is algebraizable (as is N 3, too) in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, which means that its consequence relation can be completely characterized in terms of the equational consequence of the corresponding algebraic semantics, which consists in a variety of algebras called N 4-lattices.
For our purposes, these algebraic completeness results entail in particular that we will be able to compare both N 3 and N 4 to the logic S -the main object of the present paper -by looking at the corresponding classes of algebras. But before we turn our attention to S, let us mention another remarkable feature that N 3 and N 4 share.
For the propositional part (on which we shall exclusively focus in this paper), the language of both N 3 and N 4 comprises a conjunction (∧), a disjunction (∨), a socalled "strong" negation (∼) and two implications: a so-called "weak" (→) and a "strong" one (⇒), which is usually introduced via the following term: ϕ ⇒ ψ := (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (∼ψ → ∼ϕ). The presence of two implications is instead crucial in Nelson's logics: it is this feature that makes, one may argue, the Nelson formalism more fine-grained than classical or intuitionistic logic (or most many-valued logics, for that matter). With two implications to hand, one is able to register finer shades of logical discrimination in Nelson's logics than is possible in logics that are more 'classically' oriented in nature (see Humberstone [18] for a general discussion of this idea).
In fact, different classical or intuitionistic tautologies can be expressed within Nelson logics using either → or ⇒, creating a non-trivial interplay between these two implications, and of the latter with the negation connective, so that one implication can exhibit a paraconsistent behaviour (not satisfying (p ∧ ∼p) ⇒ q) while the other retains a more "classical" flavour, satisfying it. On the other hand, while the weak implication (→) allows us to see N 3 and N 4 as conservative language expansions 1 of positive intuitionistic logic by a negation connective exhibiting certain classical features (De Morgan, involutive laws), the strong (⇒) allows us to view their alge-braic counterparts as residuated structures, and therefore to regard N 3 and N 4 as axiomatic extensions (stronger logics, over the same language) of well-known substructural or relevance logics.
We note, in passing, that the overall picture is made more interesting and complex by the fact that other meaningful non-primitive connectives can be defined -for example, an "intuitionistic" negation (which need not coincide with the primitive "strong" negation ∼) given by ϕ → 0, or a "multiplicative" monoidal conjunction given by ∼(ϕ ⇒ ∼ψ) -and by the fact that inter-definability results hold even among the primitive connectives (some of these being highly non-trivial to prove). We shall not enter into further details on this issue for this is not the main focus of the present paper; instead, we will now turn our attention to the logic S, which has been up to the present day the most obscure member of the Nelson family.
The logic that we call S (following Nelson's original notation) was introduced in [23] with essentially the same motivations as N 3, that is, as a more flexible tool for the analysis of falsity, and in particular as an alternative to both N 3 and intuitionistic logic for interpreting arithmetic through realizability methods. The propositional language of S comprises a conjunction, a disjunction, a falsity constant and a single implication: whether this implication ought to be regarded as a "strong" or a "weak" one is indeed something that became apparent only after our own investigations, as we shall see. Nelson's presentation of S is given by means of a calculus that appears non-standard, to the modern eye, in several ways. It may look like a sequent calculus, but it is not; one could say that it is in fact a Hilbert-style calculus, though one with few axioms and many rules (infinitely many, in fact: not just rule instances, but infinitely many rule schemata). Moreover, no standard semantics was provided in [23] for the calculus other than the intended interpretation of its (first-order) formulas as arithmetic predicates.
The above features might explain why S has received, to the present day, very little attention in comparison to the other two Nelson logics, to the point that, to the best of our knowledge, even the most basic questions have not yet been asked, let alone answered. One could start by asking, for example, whether S does admit a finite axiomatization after all. Another basic issue, which is interestingly obscured by Nelson's presentations of S and N 3 in [23] , is whether one of the two logics is stronger than the other or else whether they are incomparable. Last but not least, in the absence of a complete semantics for S, one may wonder how can one possibly prove that certain formulas are actually not derivable in the system, as claimed by Nelson [23, p. 213] .
The main motivation for the present paper has been to tackle the above questions and, more generally -taking advantage of the modern tools of algebraic logicto gain a better insight into (the propositional part of) S and its relation to wellknown non-classical logics in the substructural, relevance and Nelson families. As we shall see in the following sections, we have by now successfully settled all the abovementioned questions, and the corresponding answers can be summarized as follows. First of all, the logic S can be axiomatized by means of a finite Hilbert-style calculus (having modus ponens as its only rule) which is an extension of the contraction-free fragment of intuitionistic logic and also an extension of the substructural logic known as the Full Lambek Calculus with Exchange and Weakening (F L ew ). This follows from our main result that S is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable (and therefore, enjoys a strong completeness theorem) with respect to a certain class of residuated lattices, which are the canonical algebras of substructural logics extending F L ew . Furthermore, we may now say that the implication of S is indeed a "strong" one in the sense that it can be meaningfully compared with the corresponding strong implications of N 3 and N 4. From that vantage point, we will see that Nelson logic N 3 can be regarded as an axiomatic extension of S, whereas N 4 is incomparable with S. And finally, yes, Nelson was correct in claiming that the formulas listed in [23, p. 213 ] are actually not derivable in S. Furthermore, our algebraic analysis also reveals that some of the rules included in Nelson's calculus are actually redundant.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the logic S through Nelson's original presentation (duly amending a number of typos) and use it to derive a few formulas that will be used in the following sections. In Section 3 we prove that Nelson's calculus is algebraizable, and provide an axiomatization of the corresponding class of algebras, which we call S-algebras (Subsection 3.1). Because of the abovementioned non-standard features of Nelson's calculus, the presentation of S-algebras obtained algorithmically via the algebraization process is not very convenient. We shall then introduce an alternative equational presentation in Subsection 3.2 and show the equivalence of the two. As a result of our own presentation, we shall obtain that S is a substructural logic that extends F L ew . Taking advantage of this insight, in Section 4 we introduce a finite Hilbert-style calculus for S which is simply an axiomatic strengthening of a well-known calculus for F L ew . Completeness of our axiomatization, and therefore equivalence with Nelson's calculus, is obtained as a corollary of the algebraizability results. In Section 5 we look at concrete S-algebras which provide counter-examples for the formulas that Nelson claimed to be invalid of S. We present in particular (Subsection 5.2) an easy way to build an S-algebra starting from a residuated lattice, which will turn out to be useful in a later section. Section 6 establishes the relation between S and the two other already mentioned logics introduced by Nelson, N 3 (Subsection 6.1) and N 4 (Subsection 6.2). We show in particular that both N 3 and three-valued Lukasiewicz logic (but no other logic in the Lukasiewicz family) may be seen as axiomatic extensions of S. In Section 7 we use the algebraic insights gained so far to obtain some information on the cardinality of the extensions of S. Finally, Section 8 contains suggestions for future work.
Some of the results contained in the present paper have already appeared in [21] , to which we shall refer whenever doing so allows us to omit or shorten our proofs.
Nelson's Logic S
In this section we recall Nelson's original presentation of the propositional fragment of S, modulo the correction of a number of typos appearing in [23] .
We denote by Fm the formula algebra over a given similarity type, freely generated by a denumerable set of propositional variables {p, q, r, . . .}. We denote by F m the carrier of Fm, and use ϕ, ψ and γ, possibly decorated with subscripts, to refer to arbitrary elements of F m. A logic is then defined as a substitution-invariant consequence relation ⊢ ⊆ P(F m) × F m.
Definition 2.1
Nelson's logic S = Fm, ⊢ S is the sentential logic in the language ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0 of type 2, 2, 2, 1, 0 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the rule schemata in Table 1 and the following axiom schemata. We shall henceforth use the abbreviations ϕ ⇔ ψ := (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ) and 1 := ∼0. Table 1 , following Nelson's notation, Γ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } is an arbitrary finite set of formulas, and the following abbreviations are used:
We have fixed obvious typos in the rules (∧l2), (∧r) and (∼ ⇒ r) as they appear in [23, p. 214-5] . For example, rule (∼ ⇒ r) from Nelson's paper reads as:
However, this is not even classically valid. One might consider correcting it as follows:
but this does not seem consistent with the convention used by Nelson for the other rules: the ⇒ connective should appear on the right-hand side at the bottom, and ∧ at the top. Moreover, if written upside-down the rule would be redundant. This claim may indeed be justified by the following derivation in S:
The rule (C), called weak condensation by Nelson, replaces (and is indeed a weaker form of) the standard contraction rule:
Rule (C) is also known in the literature as 3-2 contraction [27, p. 389] and corresponds, on algebraic models, to the property of three-potency (see Section 3.2). Notice also that the usual rule of modus ponens is an instance of (E) for Γ = ∅:
Lastly, let us highlight that every rule schema involving Γ is actually a shorthand for a denumerably infinite set of rule schemata. For instance, the schema:
stands for the following collection of rule schemata:
Thus, Nelson's calculus employs not just infinitely many axiom and rule instances, but actually infinitely many rule schemata. Notice, however, that defining as usual a derivation as a finite sequence of formulas, we have that the consequence of S is finitary.
One of the crucial steps in proving that a logic is algebraizable (in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [7, Definition 2.2] ) is to prove that it has a set of formulas that enables one to define a congruence modulo an arbitrary theory. In our context, this entails checking for example that, if
The following proposition will help to prove this.
Proposition 2.2 ([21], Proposition 1)
The following formulas are theorems of S:
Algebraic semantics
In this section we show that S is algebraizable (and, in fact, is implicative in Rasiowa's sense [15, Definition 2.3]), and we give two equivalent presentations for its equivalent algebraic semantics (that we shall call S-algebras). The first presentation is obtained via the algorithm of [7, Theorem 2.17] , while the second one is closer to the usual axiomatizations of classes of residuated lattices, which are the algebraic counterpart of many logics in the substructural family. In fact, the latter presentation of S-algebras will allow us to see at a glance that they form an equational class, and will also make it easier to compare them with other known classes of algebras related to substructural logics.
Given the formula algebra Fm, the set of equations will henceforth be denoted by Eq and is defined as F m × F m. We write ϕ ≈ ψ rather than ϕ, ψ . We say that a valuation ν : F m → A satisfies ϕ ≈ ψ in A when ν(ϕ) = ν(ψ). We say that an algebra A satisfies ϕ ≈ ψ when all valuations over A satisfy it.
It will be convenient for us to work with the following definition of algebraizable logic, which is not the original one [7, Definition 2.1] but an equivalent so-called intrinsic characterization [7, Theorem 3.21] .
Definition 3.1 A logic L is algebraizable if and only if there are equations E(x) ⊆ Eq and formulas ∆(x, y) ⊆ F m such that:
E(x) is said to be the set of defining equations and ∆(x, y) the set of equivalence formulas. We say that L is implicative when it is algebraizable with E(x) = {x ≈ α(x, x)} ∆(x, y) = {α(x, y), α(y, x)}, where α(x, y) a binary term in the language of L. In such a case the term α(x, x) determines an algebraic constant on every algebra belonging to the algebraic counterpart of L, and is usually denoted accordingly.
Theorem 3.2 ([21], Theorem 1)
The logic S is implicative, and thus algebraizable, with defining equation E(x) = {x ≈ 1} -or, equivalently, E(x) = {x ≈ x ⇒ x} -and equivalence formulas ∆(x, y) = {x ⇒ y, y ⇒ x}. 
S-algebras

Definition 3.3
An S-algebra is a structure A = A, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 of type 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0 that satisfies the following equations and quasiequations:
of S, the quasiequation Q(R) defined as follows:
We shall henceforth denote by E(An) the equation given from Definition 3.3.1 for the axiom An (for 1 ≤ n ≤ 5) of S, and by Q(R) the quasiequation given from Definition 3.3.3 for the rule R of S. We will also use the following abbreviations: a * b := ∼(a ⇒ ∼b), a 2 := a * a and a n := a * (a n−1 ) for n > 2. As the notation suggests, the defined connective * is intended as a "strong conjunction" in the sense of substructural logics (alternative to the "weak conjunction" ∧) that will be interpreted as a monoid operation on S-algebras, and having the implication ⇒ as residuum. We shall now prove a few properties of S-algebras that will indeed allow us to view them as a class of residuated structures. 
S-algebras as residuated lattices
In this section we introduce an equivalent presentation of S-algebras which takes precisely the properties in Proposition 3.4 as postulates. We begin by recalling the following well-known definitions (see e.g. [16, p. 185] ).
Definition 3.5
A commutative integral residuated lattice (CIRL) is an algebra of type 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0 A = A, ∧, ∨, * , ⇒, 0, 1 such that:
1. A, ∧, ∨, 1 is a lattice (with ordering ≤) with maximum element 1. 2. A, * , 1 is a commutative monoid. 3. * , ⇒ form a residuated pair with respect to ≤, that is:
We say that a CIRL is three-potent 2 when a 2 ≤ a 3 for all a ∈ A (in which case it follows that a 2 = a 3 ). If the lattice ordering of A also has a minimum element 0, then A is a commutative integral bounded residuated lattice (CIBRL). Setting ∼a := a ⇒ 0, we then say that a CIBRL is involutive when ∼∼a = a [17, p. 186 ]. This last equality implies that a ⇒ b = ∼b ⇒ ∼a [25, Lemma 3.1].
Definition 3.6
An S ′ -algebra is a three-potent involutive CIBRL.
Since CIBRLs form an equational class [16, Theorem 2.7] , it is clear that S ′ -algebras are also an equational class. By contrast, from Definition 3.3 it is far from obvious whether S-algebras are equationally axiomatizable or not. By Proposition 3.4, we immediately have the following result.
Proposition 3.7
Let A = A, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 be an S-algebra. Setting x * y := ∼(x ⇒ ∼y), we have that A = A, ∧, ∨, * ⇒, 0, 1 is an S ′ -algebra.
The following lemma will allow us to verify that, conversely, every S ′ -algebra has a term-definable S-algebra structure. Thus, as anticipated, S ′ -algebras and S-algebras can be viewed as two presentations (in slightly different languages) of the same class of abstract structures. To establish this we shall check that any S ′ -algebra satisfies all (quasi)equations introduced in Definition 3.3.
2 The reader should be aware that for some authors, for example [16, 
4. Any three-potent CIRL satisfies (x ∨ y) 2 ≈ x 2 ∨ y 2 .
Proposition 3.9
Let A = A, ∧, ∨, * , ⇒, 0, 1 be an S ′ -algebra. Setting ∼x := x ⇒ 0, we have that A = A, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 is an S-algebra.
Proof. Let A be an S ′ -algebra.
We first consider the equations given from Definition 3.3.1. E(A1) easily follows from integrality. E(A2) follows from the fact that 0 is the minimum element of A. E(A3) follows from the definition of ∼ in S ′ and from E(A1). E(A4) follows from the fact that 1 ≈ 1 ⇒ 1. E(A5) follows from the fact that A is involutive. It remains to prove the equation ϕ ⇒ ϕ ≈ 1; this we know already from E(A1).
We now look at the quasiequations given from Definition 3.3.3 Q(P) follows from the commutativity of * and from the equation
Q(E) follows from the fact that A carries a partial order ≤ that is determined by the implication ⇒.
This follows immediately from integrality.
The quasiequations Q(∧l1), Q(∧l2), Q(∧r), Q(∨l1), Q(∨r1) and Q(∨r2) follow straightforwardly from the fact that A is partially ordered and the order is determined by the implication.
Using the monotonicity of *, we have Finally, we have Q(∼∼l) and Q(∼∼r) because A is involutive. It remains to prove the quasiequation according to which (a ⇒ b) ≈ 1 and (b ⇒ a) ≈ 1 implies a ≈ b. We have that a ≤ b and b ≤ a; since ≤ is an order relation it follows that a ≈ b.
From Propositions 3.7 and 3.9 above we obtain the desired result.
Theorem 3.10
The classes of S-algebras and of S ′ -algebras are term equivalent 3 .
In the next section we are going to use the algebraic insight gained through Theorem 3.10 to provide an alternative and more perspicuous axiomatization of S.
A finite Hilbert-style calculus for S
We are now going to introduce a finite Hilbert-style calculus and prove that it is algebraizable with respect to the class of S ′ -algebras (hence, with respect to S-algebras). This will give us a finite presentation of S that is equivalent to Nelson's calculus of Section 2, but has the advantage of involving only a finite number of axiom schemata.
Our calculus is an axiomatic extension of the full Lambek calculus with exchange and weakening (F L ew ) of [32] , which will allow us to obtain algebraizability of S as an easy extension of the corresponding result about F L ew .
The calculus S
The logic S ′ = Fm, ⊢ S ′ is the sentential logic in the language ∧, ∨, ⇒, * , 0, 1 of type 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the following axiom schemata and modus ponens (from ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ, infer ψ) as the only rule:
Axioms from (S1) to (S13) are those that axiomatize F L ew as presented in [32, Section 5] , where it is proven that F L ew is algebraizable. From that result we can immediately obtain the following:
The calculus S ′ is algebraizable with the same defining equation and equivalence formulas as S (cf. Theorem 3.2). Its equivalent algebraic semantics is the class of S ′ -algebras.
Proof. We know from [32, Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3] that F L ew is algebraizable with respect to the class CIBRL. Given that S ′ is an axiomatic extension of F L ew , by [15, Proposition 3.31] , it is also algebraizable with the same defining equation and equivalence formulas. The corresponding class of algebras is a subvariety of CIBRL that can be axiomatized by adding equations corresponding to the new axioms. It is easy to check that these imply precisely that the equivalent algebraic semantics of S ′ is the class of all involutive (S14) and three-potent (S15) CIBRL, i.e., the class of S ′ -algebras.
Although the logics S and S ′ were initially defined over different propositional languages (namely ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0 for S and ∧, ∨, ⇒, * , ∼, 0, 1 for S ′ ), we can obviously expand the language of S to include the connectives 1 and * defined by 1 := ∼0 and ϕ * ψ := ∼(ϕ ⇒ ∼ψ). This allows us to state the following.
Corollary 4.3
The calculi S (in the above-defined extended language) and S ′ define the same logic.
Proof. The result follows straightforwardly from the fact that S and S ′ are algebraizable (with the same defining equation and equivalence formulas) with respect to the same class of algebras. To be more formal one can invoke the algorithm of [15, Proposition 3 .47] which allows one to obtain an axiomatization of an algebraizable logic from a presentation of the corresponding class K that is the equivalent algebraic semantics; notice that the algorithm uses only the (quasi)equations that axiomatize K and the defining equations and equivalence formulas witnessing algebraizability.
We close the section with a non-trivial result about S that would also not have been easily proved if one had to work with Nelson's original presentation. It is well known that substructural logics enjoy a version of the Deduction-Detachment Theorem that generalizes the classical one [16, Theorem 2.14] . Combining this result with the algebraic insight obtained in Subsection 3.2 allows us to obtain a deduction theorem for S. Proof. From [16, Corollary 2.15] we have that Γ∪{ϕ} ⊢ ψ iff Γ ⊢ ϕ n ⇒ ψ for some n. Now it is easy to see that in S, thanks to (S15), we can always choose n = 2. Theorem 4.4 suggests that, by defining ϕ → ψ := ϕ 2 ⇒ ψ, one may obtain of S a new implication-type connective → that enjoys the classical Deduction-Detachment Theorem (for which n = 1). This is precisely what happens in Nelson's logic N 3, where in fact → is usually taken as the primitive implication and ⇒ as a defined one (see Subsection 6.2). Whether a similar inter-definability result holds for S as well is actually an interesting open question, which we shall return to in Section 8. For now, what we can say is that the above-defined term → does indeed behave as an implication operation on S-algebras, at least in the sense that it is an example of a weak relative pseudo-complementation in the terminology introduced by Blok, Köhler and Pigozzi [5] . The latter paper is the second of a series of papers devoted to varieties of algebras [10 3.86 ]. This applies, in particular, to our logic S and to S-algebras.
In the context of varieties of non-classical logic having EDPC, the authors of [5] single out those that possess term-definable operations which can be viewed as generalizations of intuitionistic conjunction, implication and bi-implication. These operations are called, respectively, weak meet, weak relative pseudo-complementation and Gödel equivalence. Algebras having them are called weak Brouwerian semilattices with filter-preserving operations, or WBSO for short [5, Definition 2.1].
Brouwerian semilattices are the algebraic counterpart of the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic logic. The connection between WBSOs and algebras of intuitionistic logic relies on the fact that, on the one hand, the join-semilattice of principal congruences of any WBSO forms a dual Brouwerian semilattice [5, Theorem 0.3], and on the other, a Brouwerian semilattice can be obtained as a quotient from any WBSO in a canonical way [5, Theorem 2.6.ii].
As observed in [5, p. 358] , the algebraic counterpart of Nelson's logic N 3 is a WBSO variety. The same is true for S-algebras; in fact, we can prove a slightly stronger result. Theorem 4.5 S-algebras are a WBSO variety in which a weak meet is given by ∧ (or, equivalently, by * ), weak relative pseudo-complementation is given by the term x 2 ⇒ y and Gödel equivalence is x ⇔ y. In fact, S-algebras form a subtractive WBSO variety in the sense of [1] .
Proof. One could directly check that, with the above choice of terms, S-algebras satisfy all properties of [5, Definition 2.1]. But we can provide a more compact proof as follows. As mentioned earlier, since the logic S has the Deduction-Detachment Theorem (our Theorem 4.4), we know that the variety of S-algebras has EDPC [ Regarding the proof of the preceding theorem, it may be interesting to note that applying [8, Theorem 4.4 ] to the ternary deductive term (x ⇔ y) 2 * z would give us different witnessing terms: namely, we would obtain x 2 * y as weak meet, (x 2 ⇒ (x 2 * y)) 2 as weak relative pseudo-complementation and (x ⇔ y) 2 as Gödel equivalence. This is not surprising, for such terms need not be unique.
More on S-algebras
A non-distributive S-algebra
We are now going to look at a particular S-algebra that provides a counter-example for several formulas of S that are not valid, including the formulas which Nelson claims (without proof) not to be derivable in his calculus [23, p. 213 ]. We are going to check that A 8 witnesses the failure of all the formulas listed below.
Proposition 5.2
The following formulas cannot be proved in S.
Proof. It suffices to find, for each formula ϕ above, a valuation ν :
If we were to add the ( Lukasiewicz) formula from Proposition 5.2 as a new axiom scheme to S, we would obtain precisely the three-valued Lukasiewicz logic [13, Chapter 4.1]. No other non-classical logic in the Lukasiewicz family is comparable with S because, on the one hand, they all lack three-potency, and, on the other, S does not satisfy ( Lukasiewicz), which is valid in all of them.
The Galatos-Raftery doubling construction
We present here an adaptation of the construction introduced in [17, Section 6] to embed a commutative integral residuated lattice into one having an involutive negation. This will give us a simple way to construct S-algebras, and will also prove useful in studying the relation between subclasses of residuated lattices and subclasses of S-algebras (see Section 7).
Definition 5.3
Given a CIRL A = A, ∧, ∨, * , ⇒, 1 , let ∼A = {∼a : a ∈ A} be a disjoint copy of A, and let A * = A ∪ ∼A. We extend the lattice order of A to A * as follows. For all a, b ∈ A:
For each a ∈ A, we define ∼(∼a) := a. The behavior of the lattice operations is fixed according to De Morgan's laws: ∼a ∧ ∼b := ∼(a ∨ b) and ∼a ∨ ∼b := ∼(a ∧ b). The operations * and ⇒ are extended to A * as follows:
It is shown in [17, Section 6] that, if A is a CIRL, then A * is an involutive CIBRL into which A is embedded in the obvious way. Moreover, we have the following.
Proposition 5.4 A
* is an S-algebra if and only if A is a three-potent CIRL.
Proof. One direction is immediate: if A * is an S-algebra, then it is three-potent, hence so is A as a {∧, ∨, * , ⇒, 1}-subalgebra of A * . Conversely, if A is a three-potent CIRL, since we already know that A * is a CIBRL, it remains to show that a 2 ≤ a 3 for all a ∈ A * . For a ∈ A the result follows from 3-potency of A. If a ∈ ∼A, then by Definition 5.3 we have a 2 = ∼1 = a 3 .
The following corollary concerns implicative lattices, namely, CIRL where {∧, ⇒} form a residuated pair, and hence ∧ and * coincide. Implicative lattices are precisely the 0-free subreducts of Heyting algebras.
Corollary 5.5
If A is an implicative lattice or an S-algebra, then A * is an S-algebra.
In fact, it is not difficult to check that if A is an implicative lattice, then A * is a special S-algebra known as an N 3-lattice (we shall deal with these structures in Section 6.2).
Example 5.6
Consider the three-element linearly ordered MV-algebra [13, Definition 1.1.1], that we shall call L 3 (for Lukasiewicz three-valued logic), defined as follows. The universe is {0, . It is also easy to check that L 3 is three-potent, and so it is an S-algebra.
Applying the doubling construction to L 3 we obtain the six-element linearly ordered S-algebra ( L 3 )
* with universe {∼1, ∼ 
* is an example of an S-algebra which is distributive but fails to satisfy the equation corresponding to Nelson axiom from Proposition 5.2.9. Setting ν(p) = ∼0 and
6 N 3 and N 4
As mentioned earlier, David Nelson is remembered for having introduced, besides S, two better-known logics: N 3, which is usually called just Nelson logic [22] , and N 4 which is known as paraconsistent Nelson logic [4] . Both logics are algebraizable with respect to classes of structures (called, respectively, N 3-lattices or Nelson algebras, and N 4-lattices) that turn out to be residuated. The question then arises of what is precisely the relation between S and these other logics, or equivalently between Salgebras, N 3-lattices and N 4-lattices. Can we meaningfully say that one is stronger than the other? By looking at their algebraic models, it will not be difficult to show that N 3 (which is known to be an axiomatic extension of N 4) can also be viewed as an axiomatic extension of S, while N 4 and S do not seem to be comparable in any meaningful way.
N 4
Definition 6.1 N 4 = Fm, ⊢ N 4 is the sentential logic in the language ∧, ∨, →, ∼ of type 2, 2, 2, 1 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the following axiom schemata and modus ponens (from ϕ and ϕ → ψ, infer ψ) as the only rule schema.
Here ϕ ↔ ψ abbreviates (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). The implication → in N 4 is usually called the weak implication, in contrast to the strong implication ⇒ that is defined by the following term:
As the notation suggests, it is the strong implication and not the weak that we shall compare with the implication of S. This appears indeed to be the more meaningful choice, as we shall explain below. A prominent feature of the weak implication of N 4 is that, on the one hand (unlike the implication of S), it enjoys the Deduction-Detachment Theorem in its classical form: Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ N 4 ψ if and only if Γ ⊢ N 4 ϕ → ψ. On the other hand, contraposition fails (ϕ → ψ ⊢ N 4 ∼ψ → ∼ϕ), which entails that the above-defined bi-implication does not satisfy the following congruence property (again unlike S, as mentioned just before our Proposition 2.2): we have that ⊢ N 4 ϕ ↔ ψ does not imply ⊢ N 4 ∼ϕ ↔ ∼ψ. By contrast, the strong implication of N 4 does not have the DeductionDetachment Theorem but (like the implication of S) satisfies contraposition, and the associated bi-implication (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ) does enjoy the congruence property. These considerations also apply to the logic N 3 considered in the next subsection.
It is well known [28, Theorem 2.6 ] that N 4 is algebraizable (though not implicative) with defining equation E(ϕ) := {ϕ ≈ ϕ → ϕ} and equivalence formulas ∆(ϕ, ψ) := {ϕ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ}. The implication in E(ϕ) could as well be taken to be the strong one, so E(ϕ) := {ϕ ≈ ϕ ⇒ ϕ} would work too. By contrast, letting ∆(ϕ, ψ) := {ϕ → ψ, ψ → ϕ} or the equivalent ∆(ϕ, ψ) := {ϕ ↔ ψ} would not work precisely because of the failure of the above-mentioned congruence property.
The equivalent algebraic semantics of N 4 is the class of N 4-lattices defined below [24, Definition 8.4.1].
Definition 6.2
An algebra A = A, ∨, ∧, →, ∼ is an N 4-lattice if it satisfies the following properties:
is a pre-order on A. A simple example of an N 4-lattice is A 4 , shown in Figure 2 , whose lattice reduct is the four-element De Morgan algebra. The tables for weak implication and negation in A 4 are as follows:
One can check that A 4 satisfies all properties of Definition 6.2, the quotient A 4 /≡ mentioned in Definition 6.2.3 being the two-element Boolean algebra. It is also not difficult to see that no constant term is definable in A 4 . In fact, since the singleton {b} is a subuniverse of A 4 , this element would be the only possible interpretation for an algebraic constant. But {0, 1} is also a subuniverse of A 4 , so b cannot be the algebraic constant. This implies that A 4 has no term-definable S-algebra structure, and that no constant term exists in the whole class of N 4-lattices. In particular, neither the equation x → x ≈ y → y nor x ⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y holds in all N 4-lattices. In order to compare N 4 and S we must fix a common propositional language, an obvious choice being ∧, ∨, →, ∼ , which is the primitive language of N 4 as introduced above. That is, we interpret the implication of S (up to now denoted ⇒) as the weak implication → of N 4. Under this interpretation, it is easy to check that for instance the N 4 axiom (N12) is not derivable of S (Proposition 5.2.6). On the other hand, it is well known that the weak implication of N 4 does not satisfy the contraposition axiom (A5) of our Definition 2.1: (ϕ → ψ) ↔ (∼ψ → ∼ϕ). Thus we must conclude that, over this language, N 4 and S are incomparable.
As mentioned earlier, another possible choice for a common language would be ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼ , interpreting the implication of S as the strong implication ⇒ of N 4. This is also a sensible option, for it has been recently shown [33] that the whole logic N 4 can be equivalently presented in this language: the weak implication is term definable in the ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼ -fragment of N 4.
Under the latter interpretation, the above-mentioned contraposition axiom turns out to be valid in both logics. However, the fact that the equation x ⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y does not hold in all N 4-lattices implies (via the algebraizability of N 4) that the formula (ϕ ⇒ ϕ) ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ψ), which is valid in S, is not derivable in N 4. On the other hand, the Distributivity axiom is valid in N 4 but not in S, as we have seen (Proposition 5.2.8). All the above arguments continue to hold also if we were to consider conservative expansions of N 4 such as the logic N 4 ⊥ of [24] . Taking into account the above observations, we conclude the following. In the next section we are going to see that at least in the case of the logic N 3 the second choice of language allows us to show that the two logics are indeed comparable, with S being the weaker.
N 3
Nelson's logic N 3 = Fm, ⊢ N 3 is the axiomatic extension of N 4 obtained by adding the following axiom:
As an axiomatic extension of N 4, we have that N 3 is also algebraizable with the same defining equation and equivalence formulas. N 3 is in fact implicative, and its equivalent algebraic semantics is the variety of N 3-lattices, which are just N 4-lattices satisfying the equation corresponding to the above axiom (∼x → (x → y) ≈ x → x) or, equivalently, the integrality equation x → x ≈ y → y. The latter implies that each N 3-lattice has two algebraic constants given by 1 := x ⇒ x and 0 := ∼1.
In his 1959 paper [23, p. 215 ], Nelson mentioned that a calculus for N 3 (there denoted by N ) could be obtained from his calculus for S by removing certain rules and adding others, thus leaving unclear whether one logic could be viewed as an extension of the other. Our algebraizability result for S gives us a way to settle this issue.
As in the preceding subsection, we may compare S and N 3 over the languages ∧, ∨, →, ∼, 0, 1 and ∧, ∨, ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 , this time including the propositional constants which are term-definable in both logics. The first option yields no new results, for the arguments of the preceding subsection continue to hold for N 3 too. Thus, S and N 3 are also incomparable over ∧, ∨, →, ∼, 0, 1 . The second option instead gives us the following. Proof. It follows from [31, Theorem 3.12] that (the ∧, ∨, * , ⇒, ∼, 0, 1 -reduct of) every N 3-lattice satisfies all properties of our Definition 3.6, and thus is an S-algebra. On the other hand, N 3-lattices (like N 4-lattices) are distributive, while S-algebras need not be. Thus, invoking the algeraizability of N 3 and of S once more, we have that N 3 is a proper extension of S.
Taking into account the axiomatization of N 3 given in [31, p. 326], we can add further information to the preceding proposition by saying that N 3 can be viewed as the axiomatic extension of S obtained by adding the (Distributivity) and (Nelson) axioms from Proposition 5.2. One can, in fact, do even better, showing that an Salgebra satisfying the equation corresponding to the axiom dubbed (Nelson) must satisfy (Distributivity) as well [11, Remark 3.7] . Thus we obtain the following. It is not difficult to verify (see Example 5.6) that adding (Distributivity) to S would not allow us to prove (Nelson) . Thus, if we add the Distributivity axiom to S, we obtain a distinct logic that is intermediate between S and N 3. On the other hand, it is easy to show that the weakest logic extending both S and N 4 is N 3 itself. In other words, N 3 is the join of S and N 4 in the lattice of all extensions of S. Proposition 6.6 N 3-lattices = S-algebras ∩ N 4-lattices.
Proof. It is well known that an N 4-lattice satisfying the equation x ⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y (integrality) must be an N 3-lattice.
The following information on S-algebras is also obtained as a straightforward consequence of the previous results.
Proposition 6.7
The variety of S-algebras is not finitely generated. Proof. 1. Assume A is an implicative lattice, and let us check that the Nelson equation
Clearly, the only non-trivial cases are when either a or b appear negated in the equation. Using the fact that a 2 = a and
* is an N 3-lattice. Then, for all a ∈ A, we can show that a ⇒ a 2 = 1 by instantiating the equation given corresponding to the Nelson axiom as follows:
, which implies the desired result. Thus a = a 2 , which implies that A is an implicative lattice. 2. Assume A * is an MV-algebra. Then A * satisfies the so-called divisibility equation x * (x ⇒ y) = x ∧ y [13, Proposition 1.1.5]. Now let a ∈ A, so that ∼a < A * a. We have ∼a = a ∧ ∼a = a * (a ⇒ ∼a) = a * ∼(a * a). But a * ∼a = ∼1 and so, by monotonicity, a * ∼(a * a) = ∼1. Thus, ∼a = ∼1, which implies that A = {1}.
The preceding proposition, besides characterizing the algebras of the form A * that happen to be N 3-lattices, highlights the fact that A * turns out to be an MV-algebra (or Heyting, or Boolean algebra) only in the degenerate case. For the reader familiar with the so-called twist-structure representation of N 3-lattices [24, Proposition 8.4.3] , it may be worth mentioning that (as one can easily verify) when A * is an N 3-lattice, the quotient algebra A * ⊲⊳ given by the twist-structure representation (cf. Definition 6.2) is isomorphic to the ordinal sum of A with a one-element algebra (which constitutes the bottom element of A * ⊲⊳ ).
Extensions of S
In this section we take a brief look at the finitary 5 extensions of S. As is usual in algebraic logic, we shall in fact consider the equivalent question about subquasivarieties of S-algebras (on quasivarieties and quasiequations, see e.g. [10, Definition V.2.24]). It is well known that finitary extensions of an algebraizable logic (in our case S) form a lattice that is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subquasivarieties of its equivalent algebraic semantics -in our case, S-algebras (see e.g. [15, Theorem 3.33] ). Similarly, axiomatic extensions correspond to subvarieties [15, Corollary 3.40] .
Given that there are continuum many sub(quasi)varieties of N 3-lattices 6 , we know that there are at least continuum many subquasivarieties of S-algebras. An interesting question is how many of these subquasivarieties are included between S-algebras and N 3-lattices. Using the doubling construction of Subsection 5.2 we can obtain some partial results in this direction.
Let {e i : i ∈ I} ∪ {e} ⊆ F m × F m be equations in the language of residuated lattices (which does not include the 0 constant). Let q( x) := &{e i : i ∈ I} =⇒ e be a quasiequation where x are all the variables appearing in {e i : i ∈ I} ∪ {e}. Define the quasiequation
which is built with formulas F m * in the language of S-algebras (which includes 0 and therefore the negation). Notice that if q( x) is an equation (i.e. the set {e i : i ∈ I} is empty), then q * ( x) is a quasiequation of the form:
It is not difficult to see that a such quasiequation is equivalent, in the context of S-algebras, to an equation e * that is obtained from e by substituting every variable
x in e with the term x ∨ ∼x. In other words, if q( x) is an equation in the language of residuated lattices, then q * ( x) is (equivalent to) an equation in the language of Salgebras.
Let A be a three-potent CIRL, and let A * be the bounded CIRL obtained as in Definition 5.3 (which is an S-algebra by Proposition 5.4). Notice that within A * the elements of A are precisely the solutions to the equation x ≈ x ∨ ∼x (abbreviated ∼x ≤ x), that is, A = {a ∈ A * : ∼a ≤ a}.
Proposition 7.1
For any CIRL A and any quasiequation q( x) in the language of residuated lattices,
Proof. For the rightward direction, it is sufficient to notice that all elements in A * satisfying the premisses of q * ( x) must belong to A, so we can use q( x) to obtain the desired result. As to the leftward direction, since any element a ∈ A satisfies ∼a ≤ a, we can use q * ( x) to show that q( x) holds in A.
Let Q be a quasivariety of commutative, integral, 3-potent residuated lattices. Then {A * : A ∈ Q} is a class of S-algebras by Proposition 5.4, and we can consider the quasivariety Q * := Q({A * : A ∈ Q}) generated by this class (see [15, Definition 1 .72] for a definition of the Q operator). Q * is then a quasivariety of S-algebras, and from our previous considerations we also know that if Q is a variety, then Q * is also a variety. Moreover, from Proposition 7.1 we have the following result: Proof. It is obvious that the map (.) * is order-preserving. We show that it is also order-reflecting, which implies that it is injective. Let Q 1 , Q 2 be quasivarieties of three-potent CIRLs. Suppose (Q 1 ) * ⊆ (Q 2 ) * and A ∈ Q 1 and suppose q is any quasiequation such that Q 2 q. Then, by Proposition 7.1, we have (Q 2 ) * q * . By definition we have A * ∈ (Q 1 ) * and therefore A * ∈ (Q 2 ) * , which means that A * q * . Then again by Proposition 7.1 we have A q, which means that A ∈ Q 2 . Hence, Q 1 ⊆ Q 2 as required. Thus the map (.)
* is an order embedding and therefore a (complete) lattice embedding.
By our previous considerations, (RL 3 )
* is a variety of S-algebras, and in fact it is not difficult to show that it is a proper subvariety of S-algebras; it is proper because, e.g., the equation (x ⇒ ∼x) ∨ (∼x ⇒ x) ≈ 1 is valid in (RL 3 )
* but not in all Salgebras (the algebra A 8 shown earlier being a witness). Similarly, denoting by IL 
Future work
To the best of the authors' knowledge, the present paper -together with its precursor [21] -is the first to be devoted to a semantical study of Nelson's logic S. We have thus but scratched the surface of what may turn out to be an interesting topic for future research. We mention here but three directions.
The first is to study other types of calculi for S, for example sequent or display-style calculi; in particular one would be interested in calculi that enjoy certain desirable properties (e.g., analytic, cut-free ones) and that fit well within the general prooftheoretic framework of substructural logics. Encouraging results in this direction have been obtained about N 3, but at this point it seems far from obvious whether or how these may be extended to our logic S.
The second issue may be cast in purely algebraic terms. Thanks to recent work of M. Spinks and R. Veroff, we know that N 4-lattices as well as N 3-lattices can be equivalently presented taking either the strong (⇒) or the weak implication (→) as primitive. In the case of N 4-lattices, this result turns out to be surprisingly hard to prove (see [33] ); not so hard for N 3-lattices, where the term defining the weak implication from the strong is also simpler [31, Theorem 1.1.3], viz. ϕ → ψ := ϕ ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ). The same question can now be asked about S-algebras: is it possible to axiomatize them taking the weak implication as primitive? For this, one might start by checking which theorems of N 3 and N 4 regarding the weak implication are valid in all S-algebras, once we translate them according to the preceding term. The answer seems at the moment far from obvious, and might provide us with further logical insight into S. It is well known, for example, that the {∧, ∨, →}-fragment of N 4 (recall that here the implication → is the weak one) coincides logically with the corresponding fragment of intuitionistic logic; which means that N 4 (and N 3) may be regarded as expansions of intuitionistic logic by a De Morgan involutive negation. A solution to the above-mentioned problem would then tell us whether an analogous result can be stated for the logic S as well.
Lastly, a promising line of research may be offered by the study of the where ϑ(a, 1) denotes the congruence generated by the set {a, 1} and so on. It is interesting to notice that the latter condition is almost purely algebraic, for it only relies on the presence of two distinguished elements in the algebra and (inessentially) of a partial order. Moreover, it closely reminds the properties of congruence orderability and congruence quasi-orderability studied in [2, 3] . This suggests that a purely algebraic investigation of the Nelson equation, restated as (8.1), along the lines of Aglianò's work may be a fruitful one. We are indeed planning to address this issue in a forthcoming study.
